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When Government Spending Serves the Elites: Consequences for 
Economic Growth in a Context of Market Imperfections 
Abstract. Government spending should be regarded as a social and political 
phenomenon, not merely as a technical choice. We argue that there is an implicit contract 
between the organized elites and politicians which often leads to a pro-elite allocation of 
public resources. A natural and simple taxonomy of government spending follows from 
this view: spending in public goods broadly defined which mitigate market failures 
versus spending in non-social subsidies, mainly a vehicle to serve the elites. We 
theoretically and empirically show that pro-elite spending biases are costly in terms of 
economic growth. The empirical findings are exceptionally robust. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper argues that government spending should be regarded as a social and political 
phenomenon, not merely as a technical choice. We argue that under certain conditions an 
implicit contract between the organized elites and politicians may emerge. This often 
leads to a pro-elite allocation of public spending. This paper theoretically and empirically 
examines the consequences of pro-elite biases in the allocation of government spending 
for economic growth under conditions of imperfect markets.  
The analysis highlights credit market failure, as well as failures associated with the 
creation of new knowledge (R&D) and environmental externalities, all of them 
recognized by the literature as important and pervasive in both rich and poor countries 
alike. Market failures, in combination with politicians’ pro-elite biases lead to 
government spending allocations that often retard economic growth. The theoretical 
analysis shows that credit market imperfections reduce households’ human capital 
investment and may restrict the size of the pool of individuals potentially able to create 
new ideas. By contrast, credit market imperfections tend to cause little direct impact on 
the aggregate level of physical capital investment by firms.  
This would call for direct public subsidies to households (in kind or in cash), instead of 
subsidies to firms (unless they explicitly target R&D and environmental protection), as a   2
way of countering the negative effect of credit market failure on economic growth. Yet, 
governments tend to spend a large share of their budget in subsidies directed to firms, 
which as a consequence of certain features of the political process discussed below, are 
appropriated by the large firms which are generally immune to credit market 
imperfections. Moreover, in most countries only a tiny fraction of the firm subsidies is 
directed to promote R&D and environmental protection, areas where market failure are 
well documented and likely to be relevant for large firms as well.    
The analysis leads to a natural taxonomy of government spending. It distinguishes 
between expenditures that alleviate the negative effects of market failure on asset 
investment, generally referred to as expenditures in “public goods”, and expenditures in 
private goods or non-social subsidies that do not
1.  The latter include commodity market 
subsidies, energy subsidies, credit subsidies and grants to corporations, loan guarantees, 
and bailouts of failed private financial institutions, among many others.  Non-social 
subsidies often constitute a large fraction of government spending and tend to be captured 
by the elites (Coady et. al., 2006, Baig et al., 2007;)
2.   
This is not merely a study on the effects of the composition of government spending on 
growth. The taxonomy proposed here is based on certain key characteristics of politicians 
                                                 
1 As discussed later, we define “public goods” broadly to include certain direct subsidies to households 
(education, health, and other social transfers), expenditures in environmental protection, R&D, and 
knowledge diffusion, as well as expenditures in conventional public goods.  
2 An illustration of the magnitude of these subsidies is provided by the following examples: worldwide 
farm subsidies reached $500 billion in 2001, 1.5% of the world GDP or 4.5% of total government revenues 
(Anderson et. al., 2006).  In a sample of 48 countries, governments are estimated to spend in the range of 1 
to 5% of annual GDP on fuel subsidies mostly benefiting large firms and wealthier households (Coady et. 
al., 2006). Examples about the enormous public costs of recent bail outs of large financial corporations (in 
part needed as a consequence of their inadequate regulation) in the USA and other countries abound in the 
popular press.  The direct cost to US taxpayers of the S&L financial crises of the late 1980s has been 
estimated at $150 billion mostly spent over the period 1989-92 or about 4% of the total federal spending in 
each year (Curry and Shibut, 2000). The main source of the crisis was the decision to deregulate the 
industry in the early eighties.  No one knows what will be the final cost of the current mortgage crisis to US 
taxpayers, but such cost may dwarf the S&L costs.   
   3
which make most of them systematically favor the wealthy, whose economic interests are 
mainly represented through the ownership and especially the control of the corporate 
sector. It is certainly nothing new to say that if governments wanted to maximize social 
welfare they should concentrate on the provision of public goods, including “pure” public 
goods as well as other goods which the private sector under supplies as a consequence of 
obvious market failures. Yet, as illustrated earlier and shown below, governments tend to 
direct a large share of public resources to subsidize the wealthy corporate sector, both 
directly and through market interventions, despite that such a sector is mainly immune to 
most market failures. Given a fiscal budget, corporate subsidies crowd out the provision 
of many public goods and reduce the ability of the government to deal with the negative 
consequences of market failure.  Governments appear willing to accept significant social 
losses for the sake of favoring the elites.  
Several studies have shown the existence of specific public policies (i.e. trade policies) 
used by governments to benefit especial interest lobby groups, in exchange for bribes 
and/or political contributions (Grossman and Helpman, 2002). While this may be a 
mechanism appropriate to analyze the connections between policies and the lobbying of 
specific groups, it may not illuminate the much more pervasive but also less obvious 
ability of the elites, as one class, to generate systematic policy biases in their favor
3.  This 
                                                 
3 To assume that the elites are able to act as one class may seem exaggerated. However, in most countries 
the elites are able to act with at least a degree of cohesiveness as shown by the existence of powerful and 
centralized business federations representing the corporate sector in almost all countries. These 
organizations mostly perform generic lobbying, generally not targeted to benefit any particular industry, but 
instead to “improve” the overall policy environment to the extent that such improvements favor their 
common interests.   Furthermore, the elite may have de-facto political power due to their small number and 
thus greater ability to solve the collective action problem (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).   4
cannot merely be explained as a direct exchange of bribes or campaign contributions 
between specific groups and politicians
4.  
There are more subtle and effective mechanisms that the elites, as an organized entity, 
can use to generate an overall policy environment favorable to their interests:  (i) the 
creation of an ideology of the elites. Given that subsidies to firms are mainly captured by 
the large firms controlled by the elites, it would be to their benefit to promote certain 
viewpoints, for instance, “subsidies to firms are good for growth and employment,” 
possibly using think tanks, the media and universities under their control as instruments 
to propel the gospel. This ideology may create an environment of complacency towards 
non-social public subsidies which are often regarded to perhaps affect distribution but not 
economic efficiency.  (ii) The implicit contract.  Politicians know that if they are “well-
behaved” (meaning keep the economy stable and normal, while maintaining or enhancing 
pro-elite policies) they will be rewarded through steep speech fees, juicy consulting, 
directories, and so forth, especially once they leave office. We show below that this 
implicit contract is supported, that is, there are incentives to both parts to make such a 
contract a stable equilibrium.   A politician facing a choice between spending fiscal 
money in improving public schools in a poor neighborhood or subsidizing a large firm,  
may choose the latter. After all, the grass root organization in the poor neighborhood has 
little to offer the politician (perhaps not even votes, due to the low voter turnouts by the 
poor) while it is always possible to obtain significant private benefits from the large firm 
                                                 
4 After all unions, grass root organizations, student organizations, or even organizations of the poor could 
also bribe and offer political contributions to politicians. Yet the overall policy environment is not precisely 
dedicated to benefit such groups. Non-elite groups can eventually get especial favors from governments but 
mainly if they resort to political action including strikes and other means to create social upheaval. Often 
the especial benefits to politically active non-elite groups are at the cost of neglecting the needs of other 
segments of the ordinary citizens that are less politically vigilant, not at the cost of the benefits to the elites.      5
or its associates once they leave office. Furthermore, the subsidy to the firm can be 
publicly justified as an incentive to the firm to “create more jobs for the poor”.                                              
This paper shows that in a context of market failure, the pro-elite bias of government 
spending is not only an issue of distribution as the ideology of the elites has led many to 
believe, but it also has grave negative consequences for economic efficiency and growth.    
Switching government spending from non-social subsidies to public goods broadly 
defined is likely to be good for economic efficiency and growth. We subject this 
hypothesis to rigorous empirical testing using a large sample of developed, middle 
income, and poor countries. We show that, unlike other findings in the government 
spending and growth literature, this result is robust to a variety of changes in the 
econometric method used, control variable selection, data sample, and countries included. 
This study may thus be regarded as a modest contribution to attenuate the pro-elite 
ideological biases discussed earlier.  
Empirically measuring the strength of the effect of the fiscal mechanisms on growth has 
been the object of many studies. A weakness of this literature has been the general lack of 
a solid conceptual framework that would allow them to establish a clear taxonomy of 
expenditures to generically separate spending patterns that are pro growth from those that 
are not. This conceptual weakness is probably a reason for its rather disappointing and 
non-robust findings.  Barro (1991), and Levine and Renelt (1992), for example, find that 
government spending has a negative effect on growth, while Ram (1986) finds a positive 
correlation. Still others find that there is no correlation between both variables (Kormendi 
and Meguire, 1985; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). More recent analyses have shifted their 
attention to the composition of government expenditures (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993,   6
Islam, 1995, Devarajan et al., 1996). However, these studies have not yielded more 
definitive results than the studies that use aggregate spending.  
2. Conceptual Model and the Central Hypothesis 
We focus on three types of market failures: (i) Asymmetric information, moral hazard 
and transaction costs in credit markets that result in credit rationing and other capital 
market effects (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hayashi, 1985). 
(ii) Spillovers in the generation, adoption, and diffusion of knowledge (Hoff and Stiglitz, 
2000) and externalities affecting environmental resources (Dasgupta, 1996). (iii) The well 
known inability of a market economy to autonomously provide for conventional public 
goods or goods that tend to be non-exclusionary and/or non-rivalrous.  
The obvious effect of (ii) and (iii) is that the economy may under-invest in R&D, 
knowledge diffusion and environmental protection, and conventional public goods, 
respectively. The effects of credit market failure on asset accumulation are more 
complex. Below we provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of the latter effects. 
2.1 Credit market failure  
Recent empirical literature has shown that credit market failure is pervasive in both poor 
countries (Haque and Montiel, 1989) and rich ones (Attanasio et. al., 2008; Grant, 2007; 
Jappelli, 1990; Zeldes, 1989). We consider two types of credit market failures: credit 
rationing due to collateral requirements, and transaction costs that cause a wedge between 
the cost of lending and borrowing money
5.  
2.1.1 Assumptions.  
                                                 
5 Hayashi (1987), for example, defined economic agents as credit constrained if either (i) they face some 
quantity constraint on the amount of borrowing, or (ii) the loan rate available to them is higher than the rate 
at which they could lend.      7
Consistent with existing empirical evidence, we assume that credit rationing affects only 
some of the households and firms (presumably the least wealthy), while others can 
borrow freely in the formal sector
6. To sharpen the analysis, we assume that constrained 
firms and households are those with net wealth below a certain critical level which 
impedes access to the formal credit market. This confers an advantage to financially 
unconstrained firms. However, below we show that by remaining small, constrained 
firms may still coexist with unconstrained ones due to the existence of credit transaction 
costs in addition to credit rationing.  
Additional assumptions: (A.1) The economy is small and open; firms and households are 
price-takers in input and output markets, and the unconstrained firms can borrow freely in 
the international market. (A.2) Firms produce a single output using physical capital and 
various types of labor skills under constant returns to scale, and a common production 
technology. The production function is homothetically separable in capital and the 
various types of labor inputs. (A.3) Individuals invest in human capital, which combined 
with their fixed factors -such as their innate ability level- produce enhanced labor 
productivity (i.e., higher labor skills) through a “production function” which, due to the 
fixity of the individual’s ability, is subject to decreasing marginal product to human 
capital
7. (A.4) The various labor skills are perfect substitutes for each other in the firms’ 
production function up to a scale factor. One hour of a high-skilled worker is equivalent 
to more than one hour of work by a lower skilled worker.   
                                                 
6Whited (1992), for example, presents empirical evidence showing the existence of asymmetric information 
in debt markets and that a significant portion of firms were liquidity constrained while others were not 
constrained at all.    
7 Henceforth, we will refer to the “household” or individual worker interchangeably as agents that invest in 
human capital as a source of labor skills.      8
Assumptions A.1 to A.3 are fairly standard in the literature. Assumption A.4 is less so, 
but is made to reduce the dimension of the labor market effectively to just one market. 
This assumption, in combination with (A.2) allows for the existence of a composite wage 
rate and a labor aggregator function. The wage rates for the various skill levels are 
derived with reference to the composite wage rate according to the corresponding skills 
This assumption oversimplifies the effects of labor skill differences in production but one 
needs to keep in mind that the focus of the analysis is not the labor market and that 
relaxing A.4 is unlikely to change the results qualitatively.   
2.1.2 Supply of labor skills and human capital 
Each worker has one unit of raw labor. By investing in human capital (h ), she can 
increase her effective labor power by a function 1 + () h ψ . By A.3,  / 0 h ψ ∂∂ > ; 
22 /0 h ψ ∂∂ < . Also, we assume (0) 0 ψ = . If  0 h = , then the effective labor is just equal to 
raw labor with wage, w. As will be shown below, given perfectly competitive labor 
markets and A.4, the wage rate of a worker with human capital  s h  is  (1 ( )) ss wh w ψ =+ . 
Financially unconstrained individuals face a fixed lending rate r at which they can 
borrow unlimitedly. Constrained individuals cannot borrow at all and consequently have 
to finance their investment (and consumption) out of their own wealth. Each worker 
maximizes her utility over two periods. Initially the individual earns a given wage rate, 
according to her initial level of h-which without loss of generality we assume is zero- 
and has a fixed level of wealth, s0. Whether or not an individual is financially constrained 
depends on her initial level of wealth.  
The worker’s utility in period 1 is u (c1), where c1 is the level of consumption, 
10 cw sB h =++− , (the level of borrowing,  0 B ≥ for unconstrained households and   9
0 B = for constrained ones). In period 2, the individual earns an augmented wage level 
from investing in human capital and repays the amount borrowed. The discounted utility 
in period 2 is  2 () / ( 1  ) uc ρ +  (ρ is time discount rate) and  2 (1 ( )) (1 ) ch w r B ψ = +− + .  The 
worker maximizes the present discounted value of her utility.   
Access to formal lending requires a minimum level of initial wealth. Let s* be the money 
in period 1, in addition to wage income, needed to finance both (optimal) consumption 
and the investment in human capital. Lending institutions then set a minimum wealth 
level requirement to access formal lending. The required initial wealth level should cover 
a minimum fraction of s* , s =ξs* , where 0<ξ <1. The two-period optimization is, 
(1)   12 , max ( ) ( )/(1 )
hB uc uc ρ ++ . 
First order conditions for the unconstrained individuals (i.e., those with 0 ss ≥ ) are: 
(2)  12 12 '( ) ((1 ) /(1 )) '( ) 0; [ '( ) ((1 ) /(1 )) '( )] 0; uc r uc uc r uc B ρ ρ −+ + ≤ −+ + =       
(3)   12 12 '( ) ( '( ) /(1 )) '( ) 0; [ '( ) ( '( ) /(1 )) '( )] 0. uc h w uc uc h w uc h ψ ρψ ρ −+ + ≤ −+ + =  
Assuming an interior solution, combining (2) and (3) yields  
(4)    '( ) 1
u hw r ψ =+. 
Unconstrained individuals optimally invest in human capital at a level 
u h by equalizing 
the marginal value product of human capital to the marginal cost of borrowing. 
Substituting the optimal investment level 
u h into (2) yields the optimal borrowing level, 
B*. Strict concavity of ψ  ensures that 
u h is increasing in w (and decreasing inr ). From 
(4) it follows that 0 /0
u hs ∂∂ = , human capital investment by an unconstrained worker is 
unaffected by her level of wealth.    10
For Financially constrained individuals (i.e. 0 ss < ) Equation (2) becomes a strict 
inequality of reverse sign, 
 (2’)    12 '( ) ((1 ) /(1 )) '( ) 0 uc r uc ρ −+ + > ;      
Condition (3) is still valid and holds as an equality if 0
c h > . In fact, the level 
c h is given 
by solving this equality. Combining (2’) and (3) (assuming 
c h >0) shows that, 
(5)           ( ) 1
c hw r ψ′ >+. 
Using (4) we have  '( ) '( )
cu hh ψ ψ > , which is the key distortion caused by credit market 
imperfections. Strict concavity of ψ  implies that for identical individuals
uc hh > .  
From (3) it follows that  /0
c hr ∂∂ =  and 0 /0
c hs ∂ ∂>; that is, the cost of capital does not 
affect investment of financially constrained households but their level of initial wealth 
increases investment in human capital.  
The “Investment Jump” effect: Consider a subsidy m  to a financially constrained 
individual. The subsidy will have a positive marginal (continuous) effect on h if the 
individual remains under the same financial regime, i.e., if she remains financially 
constrained. However, if m  is sufficient to make  0 sm s + ≥ , then the financial regime of 
the individual switches, becoming now unconstrained. This, in turn, means that the 
investment-initial wealth schedule may have a discontinuity, having a discrete rise 
possibly of a much greater magnitude than what the within-regime marginal effect would 
be. Thus, the potency of subsidies to constrained households in raising human capital can 
be quite large. For the households that are near the border of the financial regime, even a 
small lump-sum subsidy can have a dramatic effect on hby propelling them into an 
unconstrained financial regime. We call this the Investment Jump Effect. Appendix A 
provides an illustration of this effect.           11
From assumption A.4, it follows that since each individual has just one unit of raw labor, 
the individual  ' is  labor supply in period 2 in efficiency units is (1+ψ(
i h )).  The 
economy’s aggregate labor supply in efficiency units,
S L , is the sum of the efficiency 
labor of C financially constrained individuals and U unconstrained individuals.  Thus,  
(6)                                =
S L (1 ( ))
c
cC h ψ
∈ + ∑ +( 1 ( ) )
u
uU h ψ
∈ + ∑ . 
The level of aggregate labor supply in efficiency units is decreasing in the proportion of 
financially constrained individuals. For a fixed C+U level, 
S L is decreasing in C. 
Since the total level of human capital in period two is less than optimal, there is aggregate 
underinvestment in human capital. Moreover, there is no market mechanism that would 
induce unconstrained households to invest more in human capital to compensate for the 
underinvestment by constrained households. As we shall see, this is an important 
difference with the case of firms’ investments in physical capital.  
Important implications of the previous analysis are summarized in the following Lemma. 
Lemma 1. (i) Across-the-board lump-sum subsidies to all households increase the 
aggregate supply of efficiency labor, possibly inducing the Investment Jump effect among 
a subset of them and reduce the extent of the distortion represented by the 
'( ) '( )
cu hh ψ ψ −  gap.  (ii)  Subsidizing the cost of capital (r) increases investment by 
unconstrained households and the aggregate labor supply in efficiency units, but it 
exacerbates the original distortion. 
 The proof of Lemma 1 is self-evident following by inspection of Equations (1) through 
(6) and our earlier comments.  Part ( ) i is its most important one.  The untargeted 
household subsidy causes a double positive impact on human capital: (a) it increases 
hamong constrained households that remain so; (b) It reduces the number of constrained   12
households inducing the Investment Jump effect for those individuals that are able to 
switch regimes from constrained to unconstrained. As a consequence of this double 
effect, lump-sum subsidies to households even if untargeted, can be highly effective in 
promoting human capital investment and in offsetting the distortion caused by imperfect 
credit markets.  By contrast, subsidies to the cost of capital can also increase human 
capital investment but at the cost of worsening the distortion.      
An important consequence of the promotion of human capital investment induced even 
by untargeted household (direct) subsidies is that the pool of individuals with potential 
capacities to create new ideas is likely to be enhanced. This, in turn, may increase the 
flow of new ideas which, as is well recognized, is a key source of productivity growth.  
Lemma 2 below presents this result and proof. 
Lemma 2. (On productivity growth). Subsidies to households are likely to induce faster 
productivity growth over time on a permanent basis
8.  
Proof. The creation and adaptation of new ideas requires that a large and rising number 
of individuals be able to continuously participate in such intent. In addition, the creation 
of ideas needs social interactions among large numbers of individuals. The continuous 
process of try and errors and mutual exchange of experiences by a large number of able 
individuals is a key source of productivity growth. Unleashing human creativity needs a 
minimum level of knowledge and other forms of human capital. When a large segment of 
the population is marginalized from such a process as a consequence of their inadequate 
human capital, the potential for interactions and creativity are greatly curtailed and the 
flow of new ideas is diminished. Consequently, the rate of productivity growth is likely to 
                                                 
8 Here we focus only on the effect of direct subsidies to households. The household sector can also be the 
indirect beneficiary of subsidies to firms. However, as we show below, subsidies to firms tend to benefit 
mostly large corporations owned by households unaffected by credit constraints.  In addition, we also show 
that the wage effect (which could benefit non-elite households) of subsidies to firms is likely to be small.   13
be low as well.  Thus, a pro-household government spending, by contributing to increase 
human capital and thus to enlarge the potential pool for human creativity, is likely to have 
permanent effects on productivity growth and hence economic growth.  An economy that 
allows a large portion of its population to acquire the levels of knowledge needed to be 
part of the pool of potential discoverers has a permanent advantage by constantly pushing 
its relevant knowledge frontier over one that condemns most of its population to 
inadequate human capital⊗.     
Lemma 2 emphasizes not only the level of human capital as a condition for an individual 
to be part of the creativity networks but especially the density of the creative interaction 
networks as an essential source of productivity growth. Thus, a minimum level of human 
capital enables an individual to be part of a creation network (which may raise her wage), 
but the key issue is that the rate of development of new ideas depends on an externality; 
that is, on the interactions with similarly qualified individuals which, in turn, depends on 
the density of the creativity networks.         
 2.1.3 Physical capital investment and the economy’s demand for labor
9  
By A.2, the firms’ production function is separable in the various labor skills and capital; 
that is, the firm’s j production function is 10 1 ( ) ( , ( , .... ))
jj j j j j
M qa f k l l l l − =+ Δ , where 
j k is 
firm j’s  capital,  02 ( , .... )
j jj j
M lll l is an increasing and homogenous of degree one function of 
the M+1 labor skills used by the firm, and the function  f ( ) is also homogenous of 
degree one. The term ( 1 a− +Δ) represents a total factor productivity function which is 
comprised of the existing productivity level plus its increase during the current time. 
According to Lemma 2 the increase in productivity, Δ, depends on the aggregate level of 
                                                 
9 This section focuses on physical investments by firms abstracting by the time being investment 
in R&D which are likely to be affected by market imperfections other than credit market imperfections.   14
human capital and density of the creativity networks. This reflects the idea that people 
with a minimum level of human capital are constantly producing new ideas, some of 
which contribute to Δ.   
The flow of productive new ideas (i.e., the additions to the existing knowledge, 1 a− ) 
depends on the pool of qualified people, that is, on the stock of human capital. If the stock 
of qualified people increases, the rate of the flow of new ideas expands because there are 
more people engaged in the process of creating new ideas. This also increases the density 
of qualified people which facilitates the interactions thus enhancing further their 
effectiveness in creating new ideas.  Even if the stock of qualified people is constant, 
there will exist a flow of productive new ideas which allows that the total factor 
productivity of the economy increases over time (i.e., to allow Δ to be positive)
10.  Also, 
1 a− is a function of the knowledge that was developed in the past.  The level of 
1 ()
s aL − +Δ  is assumed taken as given by firms. For notational simplicity we will 
define 1 () ()
s s aL a L − ≡+ Δ.   









=+ ∑ , 
where 
j
s l is the number of workers of skill s used by the firm j. Without loss of generality 
we order the labor skills from the least skilled,  0 l  ( 0 () h ψ =0) to the most skilled  M l .     
The variable or short run profit function of firm j conditional on a given level of 
j k  is, 
                                                 
10 Here is the following analogy: Society can be compared to an engine that is in permanent operation. The 
engine produces a constant output. The rate of new output being produced per unit of time will depend on 
the power or size of the engine (e.g. no. of cylinders). The engine is society. The output is the  flow of new 
ideas annually produced. And the size of the engine is given by the size and the degree of interactions of 
the pool of individuals able to engage in new ideas. This in turn depends on the stock of human capital. The 
level of productivity is given by the stock of existing ideas while the growth of total factor productivity is 
given by the rate of new ideas being produced.    15
(7)          
00







paf k l wl πψ
==
=+ − ∑∑ , 
where p  is the output price. The first order conditions are, 
(8)              2 /(1 ) ii paf w ψ =+ ,           0,1,......, iM =  
Since  wis the wage rate for the workers with zero skills, then from (8) it follows 
that 2 paf /(1 ) ii w ψ =+w ≡ , for all 0,1,...... iM = . That is, the wage rate for workers of 
skill ( ) s s h ψ is (1 ( )) ss s wh w ψ =+ , proportional to the wage of the unskilled workers. This 
is the wage menu faced by the household in choosing its optimal human capital, as 
discussed in the previous section. 
Note that the unskilled wage rate is equal to the marginal value product of the labor 
aggregator ( 2 paf ), which means that w can be considered a “composite” wage rate of 
the labor aggregator
j l .  Thus, we can express the firm’s profit maximization problem 
with reference to the labor aggregator and composite wage only, 




paf k l a wl π =− (, )
j kga pw ≡    
The firm j chooses the aggregate level of labor independently of the decisions regarding 
the demand for specific labor skills, and with reference only to the composite wage rate 
and not the skill-specific wage rates. The unit profit function  (, ) ga pwis linearly 
homogenous, increasing in ap, decreasing in w and convex (Diewert, 1981).  Moreover, 
the said conditions on  g  imply that / 0 ga ∂ ∂>,
2 /0 gp a ∂ ∂∂ > , and under plausible 
conditions
2 /0 gw a ∂∂ ∂ <
11. The assumption of constant returns to scale implies that the 
variable profit function is linear in 
j k  and the demand for total efficiency labor from firm 
                                                 
11 Using Hotelling’s lemma the latter condition merely implies that the firm’s output supply is decreasing in 
the wage rate (Diewert, 1981).    16
j is equal to minus the derivate of the profit function with respect tow,  2(, )
jj lk g a p w =−  
(Diewert, 1981). 
The economy’s total demand for labor in efficiency units is equal to the sum of the labor 
demands across all firms, 
D j lL ≡ ∑ . That is,  
(10)                        2(, )
j D Lg a p w k =− ∑ .    
So far, the firms’ behavior has been analyzed conditional on a given level of physical 
capital. Thus, the role of the credit market imperfections is not yet apparent. We now 
consider the firms’ investment decisions. 
At the beginning of period t, firm j has a given stock of capital,  0
j k , which is adjusted by 
choosing a level of investment, 
j I ,to maximize profits.  Thus, firms can adjust their 
investment levels within the same period, whereas households, as we saw in the previous 
section, cannot adjust their supply of skills within the first period
12. Investments in 
human capital can be affected much more slowly than investments in physical capital.  
Let own financial capital for constrained and unconstrained firms be 
i χ 0 ≥ (, ic u = ) and 
their initial levels of physical capital be  0
i k (, ic u = ).  Assume that the minimum critical 
level of total owned capital by the firm,k , is necessary for accessing capital markets. 
That is, unconstrained firms total initial wealth is  0 kk χ + ≥ . 
For unconstrained firms, 
f r is the opportunity cost of their capital. In the second stage 
unconstrained firms choose optimal investment, I
u,  
(11)  0 max( ) ( , ) ( )
u
uu f u u
I
kI g a p w r Iχ +− −     for  0
uu kk χ + ≥                                                      
                                                 
12 This assumption regarding the asymmetry between the time required for human and physical capital 
investment reflects the fact that in the real world some human capital investments often need decades to be 
completed while investment in physical capital can be completed within a few years.      17
The first order condition yields, 
(12) ( , ) 0
f ga pw r −≤ ;[ ( , ) ][ ] 0
fu u ga pw r I χ − −= ;   0
uu I χ − ≥                                               
Constrained firms also maximize long run profits by choosing their investment level,
c I , 




kI g a p w r I +−    subject to 
s cc rI χ ≤    for  0
cc kk χ + <                       
Suppose that  ( , ) ga pw= r
f so that
uu I χ ≥ . This means that if r
s < r
f, the constrained firms 
may obtain a profit by making  /
cc s I r χ = . The financially constrained firms can be 
competitive with the unconstrained ones but they need to remain small.  
Of course, constant returns to scale means that the firm level profit maximization yields 
an undefined level of capital for the firm. As usual, however, the total level of capital or 
investment can be determined at the general equilibrium level. In competitive 
equilibrium, prices adjust until (12) becomes an equality so that,  
(14)                            ( ( ) ,
s E gaL pw)=
f r   .                                                                                  
Consistent with Lemma 2, in (14) we have now made explicit the dependence of the total 
factor productivity function on the total effective supply of skills, 
s L , with  ( ) 0
s aL ′ > .  In 
a small open economy,  p  and
f r are fixed. So the adjustment comes from the labor 
market.  If initially  ( ( ) , )
s gaL pw<
f r , then investment by unconstrained firms will fall, 
reducing capital and output, and therefore the demand for labor. Thus, w falls, increasing 
the unit capital profit until  ( ( ) , )
s gaL pw=
f r . The opposite occurs if  (( ), )
s gaL pw>
f r . 
We reach an equilibrium level of the composite wage rate, 
E w , which yields (14). Given 
that the unit profit function (g ) is decreasing in wand increasing ina, it follows that the 
equilibrium wage rate is increasing in a and, hence, in the total supply of labor 
efficiency, 
s L .  An increase in the composite wage may induce positive feedback effect   18
on 
s L which would cause a second round upward effect on the wage rate due to the 
productivity increases, but under the model’s assumptions this may not occur as 
investment in hdepends on the relative wage scale, not on the absolute wage levels.       
Using (10) it follows that the total labor demand of the economy in efficiency units is, 
(15)                       2(( ), )
D Es E LK g a L p w =−   ,           
where  00 ()()






,  U  is the number of unconstrained firms and 
C  is the number of financially constrained firms.  2(, )
E ga p w<0 is the first derivative of 
the function  (,;) gpw awith respect tow. In addition, labor market clearing implies that, 
(16)                              
D L =
S L . 
The total supply of labor efficiency (and also the supply of each skill) is predetermined at 
timet, given by (6). The demand for efficiency labor must therefore adapt to such supply. 
Since the composite wage
E w is given by the equilibrium in the capital market (Equation 
(14)), the aggregate demand for labor efficiency must adjust to 
S L  via the level of 
aggregate investment in physical capital by unconstrained firms, which, in turn, 
determines
E K .
13 Thus, Using (15) and (16) we can write,  ( ; , ( ) )
ES E s KL w a L p =Ω ; 
convexity and the other properties of g  presented earlier mean that the effect of 
s L on 
                                                 
13 This means that the endogenous aggregate level of investment allows for the equalization of the 
aggregate (efficiency) labor supply and demand.  At w =
E w the whole wage structure is determined in 
accordance with  (1 ( ))
E
ss wh w ψ =+ for all  1,..., sM = . At these wages equilibrium between supply 
and demand for each skill also occurs due to the assumption that labor skills are perfect substitutes in 
production. Suppose that this is not the case and that instead there is excess supply of workers of skills . 
This causes  s w to have an incipient reduction to a level below the equilibrium one, (1+ () s h ψ )
E w , which, 
in turn, induces firms to substitute among skills by using more workers with skill s until the equilibrium 
wage rate is reestablished. Thus, demand for skills is completely flexible in adjusting to supply of skills.        19
E K for a given level of 
E w is positive. It can be shown that the effect of 
s L via 
E w cannot 
offset the direct effects of 
s L on  
E K . Thus the total effect,  /
Es dK dL >0.  
The level of aggregate output is solved recursively and is given by,  
(17)                 1(, )
jE E Qq K a a p w π ≡= ∑ = ()
s aL (; , () )
SE s Lwa Lp Ω 1(( ), )
s E aL pw π  
where  1 π denotes the first derivative of the function π with respect to  p . Equation (17) 
implies that aggregate output is not affected by firms’ credit constraints either, but it is 
affected by credit imperfections affecting the household sector, which reduces
S L and 
consequently the level of total factor productivity.  
Total labor demand in efficiency units, as well as aggregate output, depend on the total 
capital investment, and not on its distribution between constrained and unconstrained 
firms. If financial constraints to firms become tighter, say for example if 
c χ decreases, 
the economy’s aggregate levels of efficiency labor and of physical capital remain 
unaffected and, therefore, the aggregate level of output of the economy is not affected 
either. The reduced investment by financially constrained firms is exactly compensated 
by greater investment among the unconstrained ones at no efficiency cost until the 
general equilibrium conditions (15) and (16) are re-established.  
This result stands in sharp contrast with the effects of credit market imperfections on 
households’ human capital investments. Such imperfections affect not only the 
distribution of human capital across households but also the total level of human capital 
and, hence, the total supply of labor in efficiency units as well as aggregate output.  The 
larger the portion of financially constrained households, the lower the aggregate level of 
investment in human capital, investment in physical capital and aggregate output.    20
The solution to the equations (14) to (16) should be interpreted as snapshots in the sense 
that the solution defines a temporary equilibrium. That is, the equilibrium will be 
constantly changing even if no exogenous variable varies over time. The reason of course 
is that the total factor productivity ais constantly changing as its level depends on the 
stock of human capital and not on its change. Let’s retake the definition 
of 1 () ()
s s aL a L − ≡+ Δ. In the following period there will be a new addition to the stock of 
ideas,  + Δ , the size of which depends of the stock of human capital; if in the following 
period the stock human capital rises then   + Δ >  Δ, and if the stock of human capital 
remains constant we have that  + Δ =Δ, but the economy still grows.  Thus, even if 
s L is 
constant, the levels of output, physical capital and the wage rate will continuously grow.  
The following lemma and its corollary summarize the previous analysis, 
Lemma 3. Firms that are not financially constrained compensate for underinvestment in 
physical capital by financially constrained firms, while unconstrained households do not 
compensate for underinvestment of constrained households in human capital.   
Corollary to lemma 3. Growth of total factor productivity, capital and output in the 
economy are negatively affected by the impact of credit market imperfections on 
household investments in human capital. 
The theoretical model just presented is of course highly stylized, abstracting from 
complications which are not central to our problem. The model is not intended to 
describe reality but rather to illustrate certain key observations; in particular, credit 
market imperfections tend to have much more serious consequences for the household 
sector investing in human capital than for the firm sector investing in physical capital. As 
with any theoretical model, the results can be rendered ambiguous by simply relaxing   21
some of the assumptions used or by adding factors that are abstracted from the model. 
However, also as in most other economic models, the objective is to show that the above 
result is consistent with economic theory, not that it is a universal result under any 
condition
14.  One could argue that the empirical validity of its testable hypotheses is the 
ultimate yardstick to evaluate the model’s contribution.        
2.2 Lobbying and the capturing of government expenditures
15 
Credit market imperfections are often used to justify government subsidies to firms. The 
availability of subsidies, in turn, induces lobbying and other forms of directly 
unproductive activities (DUP) or rent seeking by interest groups to exert pressure upon 
the government to allocate subsidies in their favor. Politicians thus use spending in 
private goods or subsidies as a way of generating rents form private firms. This makes 
both the elites controlling the corporate sector and the politicians better off at the cost of 
society as a whole. This mechanism is perhaps more effective than the use of inefficient 
regulation of firms as a source of bribes for politicians studied by Shleifer and Vishny 
,(1994), Djankov et al (2002) among others, because in the latter case firms end up worse off, 
only politicians gain.  The use of unneeded regulations of firms often makes the elites 
unhappy which could end in the withdrawal of their political support of politicians that 
implement such regulations.   
                                                 
14 There are several possible reasons why investment shortfalls by constrained firms may not be so easily 
compensated by greater investment by unconstrained firms. For example, constrained firms most likely do 
not have identical production functions as unconstrained ones, as the model assumes. However, if 
unconstrained firms are more efficient than constrained ones (as is plausible) then substitution of physical 
capital investments would likely be even easier.  The issue is that for the household sector there are obvious 
reasons to expect poor substitution among households’ investments in human capital, while that is not the 
case for the firm sector. 
15 This section focuses on physical capital investment by firms abstracting by the time being from 
investment in R&D which is likely to be affected by market imperfections other than credit market 
imperfections.   22
Subsidies to firms are more likely to elicit lobbying and DUP than subsidies to 
households for three main reasons. First, having fewer firms than households implies that 
it is easier for producers to organize than consumers. Second, firms are more easily 
grouped by production activities with common interests than households, which tend to 
be much more dispersed with regards to both activity type and geography. Third, from 
the viewpoint of public acceptance, it is easier to justify producers’ associations 
influencing government for the sake of the productive sector than the association of a few 
wealthy households lobbying for a larger share of household subsidies, for example, 
foods stamps or public housing benefits. 
This difference helps explain an important stylized fact: Most firm subsidies are engulfed 
by very few, typically the wealthiest, firms while most of the small ones receive little of 
them. This is despite the fact that a public justification for many such subsidies is the 
protection of small enterprises “affected by lack of credit”
16.  
This also means that subsidies to firms are unlikely to benefit poor households that may 
own small firms. That is, potential spillovers of firm subsidies into the household sector 
which could help relieve household financial constraints (and thus reduce the 
underinvestment in human capital) are likely to be rather negligible.     
In contrast, the lower lobbying efforts elicited by the availability of direct subsidies to 
households implies that such subsidies tend to either concentrate on the lower income 
households (certain social transfers, food stamps, public housing) or at worst get more or 
less evenly dispersed across most households (free primary and secondary education, 
                                                 
16 Farm subsidies are a good example where a small minority of the largest farmers get the lion’s share of 
them (Alston and James, 2003). The same is true for export subsidies, credit subsidies, public credit 
guarantees, and many other subsidies directed to firms.      23
health care, social security, and others)
17. Thus, low income households are able to 
mitigate their financial constraints through at least part of the cash or in kind household 
subsidies available while subsidies to firms tend to mainly create rents for the 
unconstrained wealthier producers. In addition, from (14) and (8) it follows that neither 
the equilibrium wage rate nor the wage structure are affected by firm subsidies. We 
summarize these results in the following lemma and its corollary: 
Lemma 4. (i) Politicians have an incentive to spend a significant part of government 
spending in subsidies to firms as  such subsidies elicits more rent seeking activities than 
direct subsidies to the household sector; (ii) Subsidies to firms tend to concentrate in a 
few leading firms, and tend to have little effect on the equilibrium wage rates.      
Corollary to Lemma 4. Subsidies to firms are not likely to spillover into financially-
constrained households and, therefore, tend to do little to mitigate the effects of credit 
market imperfections on investment in human capital by households.     
2.3 Implications for government subsidy policies 
 The following two propositions summarize the key implications of the lemmas 1 to 4 
and corollaries for fiscal subsidy policies:          
 Proposition 1 (on direct subsidies to households). (i) Subsidies to households increase 
the aggregate supply of efficiency labor and enhance the human creativity pool which, in 
turn, may cause a faster rate of productivity growth, and also more investment in 
physical capital.  All this may lead to a faster rate of economic growth.  
Proposition 2 (on subsidies to firms). (i) Government subsidies to firms are unlikely to 
increase aggregate investment in physical capital, cause little spillovers into the 
                                                 
17 Note that we refer here to direct subsidies to households.  We are excluding subsidies that may indirectly 
affect households by distorting commodity markets such as certain energy subsidies and others. Subsidies 
through commodity markets are likely to elicit DUP, in addition to creating other economic distortions.    24
household sector to relieve its financial constraints and may cause efficiency losses due 
to DUP. The net effect of subsidies to firms is likely to lower output and economic 
growth.
18.  
2.4 Spending Taxonomy 
The previous analysis suggests a simple taxonomy for government spending. We 
consider two categories of government spending: Type A or broadly defined public 
goods. In addition to subsidies to households (which include social expenditures, social 
transfers, education
19, and health care) described previously, Type A expenditures also 
include environmental protection, R&D and knowledge diffusion and conventional public 
goods (law and order, infrastructure, culture, and others).  These expenditures tend to 
palliate market failures and are likely to complement the efforts of the private sector. 
Type B or expenditures in private goods. These include subsidies to firms such as credit 
subsidies, export subsidies, farm subsidies, credit guarantees, financial bailouts, outright 
grants, and other forms of corporate welfare (excluding subsidies that directly target 
R&D or environmental protection) some of them referred to as “development 
expenditures”. As discussed earlier, this type of spending generally does little to mitigate 
                                                 
18 But see below for the especial cases of subsidies that directly target R&D and environmental protection. 
19 Government expenditures in education are Type A for two reasons: (i) part of them (especially 
expenditures in primary and secondary education) reach financially constrained households and thus 
mitigate the negative impact of credit market imperfections on human capital investment. (ii) other 
expenditures in human capital may be inaccessible to all households, but they still provide positive 
externalities associated with knowledge; expanding the number and quality of university professionals 
induce social benefits over and above the benefits accruing to the individuals that invest in such studies.    25
market imperfections or to provide other public goods
20. Instead it tends to exacerbate 
some of the negative effects of certain market failures
21.  
2.5 The implicit pact and the subsidies to firms 
Although Type A spending may more effectively promote efficiency and economic 
growth than Type B, politicians may nonetheless have incentives to channel a significant 
part of government spending towards the latter. Assume that politicians’ objective 
function is to maximize the present value of their utility. This is a function of income 
while in power, income when they retire, and of obtaining and then retaining political 
power for as long as the constitution allows. We can thus model the in-power politician’s 
optimization as a two-period model. The politician is in power in the first period, while in 
the second period she retires. Income while in power is the regular salary (plus political 
contributions to remain in power as long as possible) and income in retirement is 
variable, depending on her performance while in office. 
While in office, the key concern of the politician is to avoid being booted out of office 
before her period is due which require a normal and stable performance of the economy.  
We assume that politicians falling in disgrace as a consequence of disastrous economic 
performance tend to lose everything, power and the favors from the elites once out of 
office regardless of the favors that they might have brought to them. The rate of 
economic growth is assumed not to be part of the objective function, but is part of the 
                                                 
20 Empirical studies have shown that these subsidies are at best ineffective in promoting investment and 
technological adoption and, in some instances, counterproductive (see Bregman et al., 1999 for Israel, Lee, 
1996 for Korea, Bergstrom, 1998 for Sweden, Estache and Gaspar, 1995 for Brazil, Harris, 1991 for 
Ireland). 
21 The taxonomy of government spending proposed here is quite consistent with the one recently used by 
Battaglini and Coate (2008) in their theoretical analysis of fiscal policy, where government spending either 
finances a public good or is used for pork barrel spending. They find that in equilibrium public good 
provision is too low. They conclude, as do we, that the economy’s output can be expanded by increasing 
spending in public goods provided that total spending does not increase. 
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constraint function of the politician. The politician’s objective is to help herself which 
requires a minimum overall economic performance, but once out of office her rewards 
are not based on whether the economy grew at 4% instead of 3%. Instead, the main 
rewards are based on how well the politician had served the elites.  
Thus, the optimization problem for the politician is to maximize her utility in the first 
period which is a function of the salary and the length of time she is able to stay in power, 
plus the discounted value of the variable income in the second period, subject to the 
constraint that the rate of growth while she is in office is at least as large as a minimum 
acceptable rate.  
Politicians participate in two different political games depending on the stage of their 
political situation: (i) In-office politicians running for re-election need to attract enough 
political campaign contributions to remain in power. They thus create demand among the 
most organized and economically potent actors for government-financed benefits by 
inducing competition among the many especial interest groups for accessing subsidies. 
That is, it is important to put state resources up for grabs in a way that can be 
appropriated by particular groups. One popular way of doing this has been through trade 
and other price policies including especial privileges (i.e., licenses, monopoly 
concessions, and so forth). These policies tend to cause market distortions which have led 
international organizations and economists to persuade politicians to minimize them. An 
alternative way, which has not received as much interest as the “market” distortions, is 
the biased allocation of government spending towards Type B goods. As discussed 
earlier, Type B spending can be appropriated by the groups of the elite through lobbying 
much more effectively than Type A expenditures in exchange for campaign and other 
forms of support to the politicians. (ii) In-office politicians in their final period have as a   27
primary strategy to appeal to the elites as a class rather than promoting competition 
among specific lobby groups as in case (i). At this stage the politician’s emphasis 
changes from the use of market and non-market privileges for specific groups to more 
general policies including the consolidation of the pro-elite orientation of overall 
government spending and other fiscal policies.             
In period 2, the retired “successful” politician’s income is supplemented by steep speech 
fees, directory appointments, juicy consulting jobs, and so forth. These benefits can be 
provided mainly by the elites and its organizations as a reward to former politicians that 
have been “well behaved” while in office. The incentives are clear: for politicians in 
office to serve the interests of the elites and for the organized elites to honor the implicit 
contract and reward those that did the most to enhance their interests. Honoring this 
implicit contract is rational as it constitutes an incentive for current holders of political 
power to be as “good” to the elites as possible given the constraint discussed earlier. An 
important indicator of how big the pro-elite biases of politicians in power are is the share 
of spending in Type B goods that they choose. Generally the greater the pro-elite biases 
of politicians, the greater is the preponderance of Type B spending.     
Not all political systems give equal leeway to politicians in their pursuit of serving the 
elites at the cost of social welfare. Features of democracy, participation and organization 
of the civil society in political controls, as well as specific political institutions ruling 
elections and political representation, among many other institutional features, are likely 
to influence the degree of pro-elitism of politicians.  In the empirical analysis we select 
some of these variables as candidates for instruments of the government spending 
composition indicators that we use.                                         
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2.6 The Hypothesis 
The previous analyses lead us to the following testable hypothesis and remark.  
The Central Hypothesis: An exogenous reallocation of government spending from Type 
B to Type A expenditures promotes faster economic growth.  
Remark. The reallocation from Type B to Type A expenditures promotes faster  growth 
not only because Type A expenditures are pro-growth but also because Type B 
expenditures are generally toxic for growth by inducing more waste through higher DUP 
and exacerbating distortions caused by market failure.     
3. Estimation Issues 
In testing the central hypothesis we use the share of Type A goods in total government 
spending. We now address certain issues which have been raised in the literature 
regarding the estimation of the growth effects of government spending (Kneller et. al. 
1999, Bose et. al. 2007).  
Financing and the budget constraint.  The impact of a particular government expenditure 
item on economic growth is intrinsically linked to the mechanism used to finance it
22. We 
do not face this problem. Changes in the share of expenditures in public goods in total 
spending imply a concomitant reduction of expenditures in private goods. That is, there is 
an unambiguous financing connotation which is incorporated into the estimation. 
The Efficiency of Government Spending. We have shown that the share of Type A 
expenditures is in itself a partial indicator of government spending efficiency. A narrower 
efficiency issue relates to the efficacy of specific expenditures in the provision of the 
                                                 
22 For example, the effect of increasing government spending in education on economic growth is likely to 
be different if such an increase is financed via higher taxes, higher government deficit or by reducing 
expenditures in health or in other expenditure items. Dealing with this issue requires controlling for a 
variety of financing sources, which is often a difficult task.  
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goods and services that they target, which are not necessarily good for growth. There are 
no a priori reasons to expect that Type A or B expenditures are systematically more or 
less efficient, using the latter definition of efficiency.  Thus, omitting the effect of 
government efficiency may not be of great consequence to testing the hypothesis that 
transferring fiscal expenditures from type B to A induces faster growth. In any case, we 
also use various control variables as measures of bureaucratic efficiency, which could be 
considered proxies for the level of government efficiency 
The lagged effects of government expenditures.  The effect of government spending on 
growth is likely to take time, especially Type A expenditures which often involve 
projects of long maturity such as health and education
23. The time lag is likely to be 
shorter for Type B expenditures which mainly involve financial transfers. We use five 
year averages as the unit of observation to mitigate this in part. Given the likely time lag 
asymmetries between Types A and B expenditures, if the empirical estimates corroborate 
our central hypothesis using five year observation periods, full consideration of the lags 
would give even a stronger corroboration of such an hypothesis. 
Empirical specification and control variables. We use a single equation instrumental 
variable approach and, alternatively, a system approach. The next section deals with the 
issues of identification. Here we focus on the control variables which are selected on the 
basis of three types of theories. The first emphasizes the role of governance and 
distribution of wealth on growth (Esteban and Ray, 2006; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; 
Persson and Tabellini, 1994). The second focuses on structural characteristics of the 
political constitution (Milesi-Ferretti et al, 2002; Persson, 2002, and Alesina et al, 1997). 
                                                 
23 Increasing labor training programs may have quite rapid effects.  Improving high school education may 
begin having an effect within a year if the expenditure improves the education of those in the final year of 
their education, while spending in pre-school education may take much longer.   30
The third one emphasizes geographic and other natural characteristics of countries as 
factors influencing economic growth and policies (Sachs et al, 1999).  
4. The Estimating Model 
Consider the following model, 
(18)                                
ya k h





it g , and 
h
it g  stand for per capita growth rates of country i at time t of 
output, per capita physical capital, and per capita human capital, respectively; 
a
it g  stands 
for total factor productivity growth which may include unobserved time varying factors 
as well,  i ε for fixed or random country effects and  it μ for the stochastic disturbance 
assumed to satisfy the usual conditions.   
Consistent with the theoretical model, the share of public goods in government spending 
(controlling for total government spending) is assumed to affect the growth rate of a as 
well as the rate of growth of human capital, h. Also, the (lagged) level of human capital is 
likely to affect
a
it g , 
k
it g , and
h
it g . That is,  11 1 (, ,; )
a
it it it it it gs G h Z −− − , where  1 it s − is the share of 
spending in public goods lagged one period,  1 it G − is total government spending as a share 
of GDP,  1 it h − is the stock of human capital also lagged one period, and  it Z is a vector of 
other variables that the literature have considered as affecting productivity growth. The 
growth of human capital is assumed to depend on similar factors, 11 1 (, ,; )
h
it it it it it gs G h Z −− −  , 
where the vector  it Z  may have some common elements with  it Z .  
One could also replace the variable 
k
it g  in (18) by the variables that are hypothesized to 
determine them, including of course the government spending variables as well as the 
many others that the literature has considered important in this respect, and estimate a   31
fully reduced form equation.  The problem of doing this is that  
k
it g , often proxy by the 
investment/GDP ratio, is likely to capture not only the growth of capital itself but also 
may reflect the influence of many other, possibly unobserved, factors. So omitting the 
investment/GDP variable from the estimation may cause significant specification 
problems. We thus opt to keep the physical capital investment indicator. We also use the 
lagged level of average years of schooling as a proxy for 1 it h −  as an explanatory variable. 
So the effect of the government spending variable will be reflected mainly through its 
effects on total factor productivity growth and the growth of human capital
24. Thus, 
substituting the expressions  11 1 (, ,; )
a
it it it it it gs G h Z −− −  and  11 1 (, ,; )
h
it it it it it gs G h Z −− −  in (18), we 
obtain the basis for the estimating model of the benchmark regressions, 
(19)                11 2 1 31 4
yk
it it it it it it i it gs G h Z g β ββ β α ε μ −− − =+ ++ + + + .               
We estimate equations like (19) using various single equation estimators. In addition, we 
also estimate a system model of two equations with 
y
it g and  it s as the endogenous 
variables. We use a Three Stage Least Squares approach using a specification for the per 
capita growth equation similar to (19), without of course lagging the government 
variables (more on the specification of the system equations below). 
The most important variables considered as part of the  it Z control vector were macro-
fiscal variables including government consumption expenditures over GDP, taxes over 
GDP, per capita level of GDP at the beginning of the sample period (1975), inflation rate, 
                                                 
24 However, as part of the sensitivity analysis, we also estimated a fully reduced-form version of the model 
(see Footnote 23 below).     32
and several others
25. We also used several control variables related to governance, 
institutions, demographic, and geography.  
Identification and sensitivity analyses  
We subject the central hypothesis of this paper to very stringent sensitivity tests but we 
do not of course claim that such an hypothesis is “proven”. While we use reasonably 
adequate instruments to control for the possibility of reverse causality and econometric 
methods to in part consider potential omitted variable biases, our emphasis is on 
rigorously probing the robustness of the estimators to changes in the time period, 
countries considered, control variables used and econometric specification.  This is in fact 
in the spirit of the robustness analysis prevalent in the literature (Sala-i-Martin 1997). 
We first ascertain the existence of a positive correlation between economic growth and 
the share of public goods in total government spending, which is a necessary (but 
certainly not sufficient) condition for the central hypothesis of this study to be valid. 
Next, we consider two key questions: (i) Is such a correlation due to the effect of omitted 
variables rather than a causal relation between the two variables in question? (ii) If we 
cannot rule out the existence of a causal relationship between the two variables, what is 
the direction of such causality?  
Omitted Variables. The literature has relied on fixed effects and related estimators which 
control for fixed omitted variables but not for time-varying omitted variables. To address 
this issue we use sensitivity analyses, experimenting with as broad a variety of time 
varying control variables as possible
26. This approach takes advantage of the recent 
progress in the collection of a large number of economic, institutional, and political 
                                                 
25 The use of taxes over GDP in addition to total government consumption expenditure is not a problem in 
our model since our sample shows a relatively low correlation between taxes and government consumption. 
26 Of course one cannot use all possible controls simultaneously. We follow the approach used by Sala-I-
Martin and other authors and use many combinations of subsets of the control variables.     33
indicators which qualify as potential control variables (previously considered 
“unobserved” or “omitted” variables).  
Even if by definition one cannot directly control for time varying unobserved variables, 
the larger the number of controls in the estimation, the more likely it is that some of them 
are correlated with time-varying unobserved effects. If sequentially including a large 
number of control variables does not affect the statistical significance of the correlation 
of the variables in question, this may imply that omitted variable biases may not be an 
issue. The broader and more comprehensive are the sensitivity analyses implemented, the 
stronger is the presumption that the correlation between spending in public goods and per 
capita growth is not due to time varying omitted variables.  
Reverse Causality. We address the possibility of reverse causality going from economic 
growth to public goods both conceptually and empirically. The theoretical rationale for 
the reverse causality argument is that the demand for public goods is likely to increase 
with per capita income.  Strictly, this argument points to an effect of the level of per 
capita income, rather than the rate of growth of per capita income, on the level of public 
goods provided, often known as Wagner’s law (Ram 1987; Shelton 2007). Wagner’s law 
mainly applies to total government expenditures, not the share of public goods.  
The effect of per capita income on the government’s share of public goods is positive 
only if the income elasticity for public goods is greater than the income elasticity of the 
demand for private goods provided by the government.  Even if this were the case, 
economic growth would affect the growth rate of public goods, not necessarily its level 
(Kneller et. al. 1999). Thus, the conceptual foundation to expect a strong positive effect 
of the rate of economic growth on the level of the share of public goods is rather weak.    34
Despite the evident conceptual weakness and lack of consistency of the growth-to-share 
of public good story with the relevant literature on the demand for government 
expenditures, we do address this possibility further.  First, in the single equation 
estimations we use lagged values of the share of government expenditure in public goods 
in total expenditures as the explanatory variable, which obviously by itself does not 
adequately deal with the hypothetical reverse causality. However, we note that the share 
of public goods has a much smaller variance over time than the highly unstable GDP 
growth rates
27. Thus, if GDP growth rates were an important determinant of the level of 
the share of public goods, it would have required many years of consistently higher or 
lower growth to explain even a fraction of the large observed differences in such a share 
across countries. If consistent growth differentials had occurred, they would be reflected 
in the levels of per capita income. Since we do control for the initial levels of per capita 
income, this effect would be captured by such a variable.  
Second, we use instruments. In economy-wide analyses where everything is 
interconnected, finding adequate instruments that satisfy the exclusion condition is by 
definition difficult. We use certain measures of democracy as instruments. The empirical 
literature has systematically found that democracy indicators tend to have only an indirect 
effect on growth (Brunetti, 1997, Acemoglu et. al. 2008); that is, once the usual controls 
such as investment, inflation and others are used in the main regression, certain 
democracy indicators tend to become uncorrelated with growth.  As discussed in section 
2.5 certain characteristics of democracy as well as certain institutions may be correlated 
                                                 
27 The coefficient of variability of the per capita GDP growth rate is 1.86, more than six times larger than 
that of the share of public goods (0.28). Furthermore, the share of government expenditures is highly and 
positively correlated with its lagged values for 20 years, with a minimum correlation of 0.72 significant at 
1%. In contrast, the correlations of growth rate of GDP per capita with its lagged values are smaller in 
magnitude and change signs. The lack of persistence of per capita GDP growth over time is consistent with 
earlier findings by Easterly et. al.  (2000).   35
with the allocation of government spending. A plausible hypothesis is that more 
democratic regimes tend to provide more goods that are beneficial to the majority of the 
voting population (generally Type A goods) while less democratic regimes may focus 
more on special interests demands (Type B goods) (Deacon, 2002).  
We use two indicators of democracy as well as one political institution indicator that are 
likely to be correlated with spending in public goods: (i) An overall measure of 
democracy called Polity. (ii) Number of years of democratic stability.  (iii) Political 
competition as measured by various indicators, including number of political parties, 
political representation and others. Table B1 provides definitions for these variables. 
5. Data 
The sample of includes 59 developing and 28 developed countries (using the World Bank 
definitions) over the period 1980-2004. Table B2 (Appendix B) shows the list of 
countries. Countries were chosen on the basis of data available. The share of government 
expenditure in public goods is obtained from the Government Financial Statistics (GFS) 
complemented with national data sources. GFS data is commonly used in the literature 
(Shelton 2007). The econometric estimation uses averages over 5 years as the basic unit 
of observation as a way of smoothing the non-systematic fluctuations of per capita GDP 
growth. Expenditure in Type A goods include expenditures in health, education, housing, 
social protection, transport and communication, recreation and culture, environmental 
protection, and public order and safety. Table B1 provides data source and descriptions 
and Table B2 gives the summary statistics of the variables used.   
We use the central consolidated level of government expenditures. Expenditures at the 
level of general government would be preferable, but the available data for local 
governments is scarce and generally incomplete. However, for the few mainly federal   36
countries that do have such data, we found a high degree of correlation (about 0.85) 
between the shares of government expenditures in public goods at the levels of general 
government and consolidated central government.   
6. Results 
Before discussing the econometric results we comment on certain descriptive statistics. 
Table I presents summary statistics of Type A and B spending as well as trends over 
time.  Type A or public goods on average account for 50% of the government 
expenditures, with 85% of that expenditure spent on direct subsidies to households. In 
general, there is a steady increase in public good expenditures in the sample period 
(1980-2004), mostly due to increases in direct subsidies to households. Non-social 
subsidies or Type B expenditures account for about 45% of the government expenditures, 
of which   roughly a quarter are direct subsidies to firms. The rest include indirect 
subsidies through markets and other means.  Both total private subsidies and direct 
subsidies to firms have been consistently declining in the sample time period but still 
account for a sizable portion of the total government spending.  
We now turn to the econometric results. We report various single-equation estimators of 
per capita economic growth based on the specification provided in Equation (19). For the 
vector  it Z we use the standard control variables used in the literature
28.  This specification 
is later subjected to a great number of robustness checks using many other controls.  
The standard errors of the single equation estimates provided in tables II and III have 
been corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance. The first column of Table II shows the 
                                                 
28 As a proxy for  it G we use total government consumption over GDP instead of total government 
expenditure because the variable total investment/GDP already includes government investment.    37
OLS results. Lagged share of government expenditure in public goods has a positive 
effect on GDP per capita growth, significant at 1%. We have the expected signs for 
investment over GDP, years of schooling, and inflation. Initial per capita GDP (1975) is 
negative and significant, in support of conditional convergence, a finding that is highly 
consistent with the literature. In columns 2 and 3 of Table II we report the fixed effects 
(FE) and random effects (RE) estimators. Share of government expenditure in public 
goods is consistently positive and significant across all the estimations. Apart from the 
effect of total government consumption expenditures which becomes insignificant in the 
RE and FE specifications, all the signs and significance in the OLS estimation are 
retained in the RE estimation
29.  
Reverse causality is a concern despite that, as discussed earlier, the conceptual foundation 
for this is rather weak.   As mentioned in section 4, the fact that in the single equation 
estimates we use lagged values of share of government expenditure in public goods may 
in part mitigate this potential problem. In any case, we provide below the estimates of the 
growth equation using instrumental variables (IV).   
Table III reports the IV, FE-IV and RE-IV estimators using the three democracy related 
instruments discussed earlier.  The F-stat of the first stage of the IV regression is above 
20 and for FE-IV and RE-IV they are 8.7 and 9.2 respectively. The Sargan test does not 
reject the null hypothesis suggesting that at least one of the instruments used is adequate. 
The share of government expenditure in public goods is again positive and significant in 
all IV estimations. The use of instruments appears to strengthen the results suggesting 
that the simultaneous equation biases were probably causing downward rather than 
                                                 
29 In another specification we excluded the total investment/GDP variable to also capture the possible effect 
of the share of public goods on growth via this variable. While, as expected, the size of the coefficient of 
the share of public goods does increase, such increase is generally modest and the statistical significance 
remains the same.    38
upward biases in the estimated coefficient.  It is possible that the IV procedure mitigates 
attenuation biases due to measurement errors, thus leading to higher coefficient values. 
Table IV shows the two equation system estimators (per capita GDP growth and share of 
public goods in government expenditures) obtained using Three Stage Least Squares.  
One difference with the single equation estimates is that the system estimator uses the 
current, not the lagged, government spending variables.   In addition to probing the 
stability of the findings to changes in specification, the system estimator helps to provide 
measures of the second round effects that single equation estimation cannot. Share of 
public good expenditures affects the rate of economic growth as a primary effect. But 
then there might be a second round effect arising from the possible effect of the increased 
GDP growth on share of public good expenditures itself which, in turn, feedbacks into 
GDP growth. This second round effect may reinforce or mitigate the first round effect.   
The political variables identify the current share of government spending in public goods 
equation, while the initial level of GDP and percentage of land in tropics are the 
identifying variables for the growth equation. The share of government spending in 
public goods has a positive impact on the rate of per capita GDP growth, significant at 
1%. However growth has a negative but insignificant effect on the share of government 
expenditure on public goods. This confirms the presumption that the direction of 
causality is mainly from the share of public goods to growth, not the other way around. 
Thus, the second round effects are not significant. 
The quantitative significance of the effects of the share of public goods on the rate of 
economic growth is quite large regardless of the method of estimation used. In assessing 
this we use the estimates of Table IV because their size and significance are very similar 
to the mean estimates obtained through a very large number of sensitivity analyses   39
reported in the next section.  The mean annual per capita growth rate for all countries 
used over the complete sample was 1.5% (standard deviation: 2.8) and the mean share of 
expenditures in public goods on total government expenditures was 53% (standard 
deviation: 16.7).  According to the estimates if the average country increased its share of 
public goods by one half standard deviation (roughly from 53 to 61%) its annual per 
capita growth rate could be increased by one full percentage point or roughly 40% of the 
standard deviation of the rate of economic growth; that is from 1.5% to 2.5%.  
7. Sensitivity Analysis 
We test the robustness of the previous findings in several ways
30.  
Bootstrapping.  Table C1 shows the bootstrap biased-corrected estimator of the effect of 
the share of public goods on growth with re-sampling using 10,000 iterations with full re-
sample size; it is positive and significant at 1% level thus suggesting that the estimates 
are not driven by the inclusion or exclusion of particular observations. 
Country dominance tests. Figure C1 shows the system estimator and the 5% confidence 
interval after dropping one country at a time. The coefficients are all positive and their 
confidence interval falls entirely within the positive range; thus the estimates are not 
driven by the inclusion of particular countries either. We also re-estimated the models 
using discrete changes in the country sample randomly subtracting from the sample 5% 
of countries at a time. The coefficient of interest remained positive within the 5% 
confidence interval (the latter results are available from the authors). 
                                                 
30 We conducted the sensitivity analysis for both the single equation and system estimations. However, we 
only report the sensitivity analyses implemented for the system estimates. We have chosen to report the 
latter mainly because, unlike the single equation, it allows us to do sensitivity analyses of both the reverse 
causal effect (from share of public goods to growth) and the sensitivity of the share of public goods to 
growth results.  The results for the single equation estimates, available upon request from the authors, show 
the same degree of robustness as the system estimates.   40
Extreme data tests.   We perform this test by excluding from the sample alternatively the 
top and bottom 5% of the values for share of public goods observations and for the rate of 
per capita GDP growth, respectively. Table C2 shows that performing these rather drastic 
experiments with the data did not significantly affected the estimates. 
Adding control variables. We added a large number of control variables often used in the 
literature on government spending and growth. We used all the possible combinations of 
groups of three additional control variables at a time taken from a list of 21 new control 
variables shown in Table C3.  We performed more than one thousand additional 
regressions. All estimates of the effect of share of public goods on per capita growth 
turned out to be positive. Moreover, as shown in Table B4, both the weighted (using the 
value of the log-likelihood of each regression as the weighting factor) and the un-
weighted mean value of the estimated coefficients were statistically significant at 5%.   
In sharp contrast with the effects of share of public goods on growth, the effects of the 
rate of growth on the share of public goods is not statistically significant and is positive 
only in 27% of the regressions (Table C5). Also, the mean coefficient value estimated is 
negative. That is, reverse causality does not appear to be relevant.  
8. Conclusion 
This paper has shown that the tendencies of many governments to direct a significant part 
of their spending in favor of the elites may have dramatic negative consequences for 
economic growth. Switching fiscal expenditures from non-social subsidies to public 
goods, keeping total government spending constant, promotes faster economic growth.  
The empirical results obtained are fully consistent with the theoretical model which 
shows that under spending in direct household subsidies and in other public goods for the 
sake of subsidizing the corporate sector has a large and highly significant and permanent   41
impact on growth. This finding is important because most countries spend a large fraction 
of their fiscal revenues in private goods; the average country in our sample spends more 
than 40% of the total government revenues on private goods. 
The basic result passed broad and rigorous sensitivity tests with great consistency. The 
average country can increase its per capita GDP growth rate by one full percentage point 
(from 1.5% to 2.5%) by increasing its share of public goods from 53% of its government 
budget to 61% (one half standard deviations). This is a large effect that could, after a few 
decades, make the difference between development and underdevelopment.  
Should this large impact be astonishing? Given that governments spend one third of 
national income or more, a misallocation of part of such expenditures can be expected to 
have large consequences.  Wasting 10% or more of the total output produced by the 
economy is a serious issue. Using such an enormous amount of resources in subsidies 
that are at best ineffective and at worst toxic for growth instead of allocating them to 
enhance the potential for creativity of individuals, in health care and better infrastructure 
is likely to be highly deleterious for economic growth.  
In addition, this finding is consistent with results of disaggregated micro studies that have 
used altogether different approaches and data. Micro econometric studies have reported 
large rates of return to public investment in R&D, to primary and secondary education, 
and to infrastructure investment as shown by surveys by Alston et al. (2000), 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, (2002), and World Bank, 2000, respectively. These 
expenditures are all important public goods based on our taxonomy. By contrast, studies 
have consistently reported very low or negative returns to government non-social 
subsidies, including energy subsidies, agricultural subsidies, rural credit subsidies and the 
likes (López and Galinato, 2007; Falck, 2007).      42
Table I: Trends in the Composition of Government Expenditures (% of total spending) 
 
Government expenditures in Public 
Goods (Type A) 
Government expenditures in Private 
Goods (Type B) 
 
 Household  Subsidies 
Other Public 
Goods 





Average over time period (1980-
2004) and all countries 
45 8 11 35 
 
Period Averages 
1980-1984 average  40  7  14  38 
1985-1989 average  40  7  13  38 
1990-1994 average  47  8  11  35 
1995-1999 average  49  8  10  31 
2000-2004 average  51  8   7  33 
 
 
    
Top Third (based on share of 
Type A spending) 
62 9 
7 21 
Middle Third  46  8  10  35 
Bottom Third   25  8  16  48 
      
Public Goods: Top 3 countries 




Austria 72  7  5  15 
Uruguay 69  7  3  20 
Switzerland 68  8  5  18 
 
Public Goods: Bottom 3 
countries (average over 1980-04) 
    
South Africa  13  6  13  59 
Indonesia 19  8  16  56 
Turkey 
 
22 7 14 56 
* Household subsidies include Education, Health, Social Security and welfare, Religion and Culture, public Housing 
and social transfers. Other public goods include: Environmental Protection, Research and Development, Public Order 
and Safety, Transport and Communication. Direct subsidies to firms include Economic Affairs (excluding Transport 
and Communication). Administration expenditures are included in each category. 
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Lagged  Share of Govt. Exp. in 
Public Goods in Total Govt. 
Expenditure  
 
[0.011] [0.027] [0.012] 
-0.034* -0.007  -0.027  Lagged Total Govt. Consumption 
over GDP 
 
[0.019] [0.075] [0.023] 
-0.002 -0.0002 -0.001  Taxes over GDP 
 
 
[0.001] [0.0023] [0.001] 
0.075** 0.039  0.075***  Total Investment over GDP 
 
 
[0.030] [0.056] [0.034] 
-0.113***  -0.109***  Log of Initial per capita GDP 
 
 
[0.042]  [0.051] 
-0.013*** -0.016** -0.014***  CPI Inflation rate 
 
 
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] 
1.920*** 1.618 1.922***  Lag of Log Years of Schooling 
 
 
[0.617] [1.486] [0.707] 
-0.891*  -0.976*  % Land in Tropical Areas 
 
 
[0.489]  [0.592] 
-0.002  -0.001  Federal Dummy 
 
 
[0.004]  [0.005] 
Number of Observations  269  252  269 
Number of Countries  84  67  84 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Unit of observation: 5 year averages. 
 
Notes: 
i) Small sample and robust standard errors in brackets. Estimated using the Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator of variance. 
ii) Estimates include constants (apart from FE estimation), year dummies (and region dummies for Latin 
America, East Asia, and Developed countries in the OLS and RE estimations), not shown in the table.  
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0.124***  0.201** 0.153*** 
 
Lagged Share of Govt. Exp. in 
Public Goods in Total Govt. 
Expenditure 
 
[0.041] [0.088] [0.050] 
-0.036* 0.059  -0.02  Lagged Total Govt. Consumption 
over GDP 
 
[0.022] [0.091] [0.032] 
-0.001 -0.004 -0.001  Taxes over GDP 
 
 
[0.001] [0.004] [0.003] 
0.069** 0.061  0.068*  Total Investment over GDP 
 
 
[0.032] [0.062] [0.036] 
-0.136***  -0.135***  Log of Initial per capita GDP 
 
 
[0.045]  [0.047] 
-0.005 -0.012* -0.009  CPI Inflation rate 
 
 
[0.008] [0.007] [0.007] 
1.709*** 1.451  1.571**  Lag of Log Years of Schooling 
 
 
[0.632] [1.685] [0.665] 
-0.341  -0.521  % Land in Tropical Areas 
 
 
[0.621]  [0.947] 
0.002  0.007  Federal Dummy 
 
 
[0.005]  [0.008] 
Sargan-Hansen Statistic (P-value) 
 
0.400 0.714 0.422 
F-stat of First Stage 21.2  8.7  9.2 
Number of Observations  269  252  269 
Number of Countries  84  67  84 




 i) Small sample and robust standard errors in brackets using the Huber/White/sandwich estimator 
of variance 
ii) Estimates include constants (apart from FE estimation), year dummies (and region dummies for 
Latin America, East Asia, and Developed countries in the OLS and RE estimations), not shown in 
the table 
iii) Instruments for the lagged share of government expenditures in public goods in total 
government. expenditure: polity, political competition, years of democratic stability, all lagged.  
iv) Over-identification restriction that the instruments are valid is accepted comfortably (at p-values 
greater than 0.400)  
v) Hausman test is not rejected in favor of Random Effects (p-value of 0.275).  
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Table IV: Government Share in Public Goods and GDP per Capita Growth: Three Stage 




Growth of GDP 
per capita 
 
Share of Govt. Exp. in Public 









0.116***   Share of Govt. Exp. in Public 
Goods in Total Govt. Expenditure 
 
[0.041]  












































No. of Countries:87, Obs.=283, Unit of observation: 5 year averages. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Small sample standard errors in brackets; Estimates include constants,  year and region dummies (Latin 
America, East Asia, and Developed), not shown in table  
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APPENDIX A: The “Investment Jump”: An Illustration 
 
 
Below we provide an illustration of the investment schedule for households that differ 
only in their initial levels of wealth using numerical simulation. 
Assumptions: 
ln uc = ;    bh
α ψ = ;   ρ=r =0.05;     1 w = ;   B =0;  5 b = ;  0.5 α =   
 
Constrained Household: From first order conditions (Equation (3) in the text assuming 
interior solution for h) we get the following solution in implicit form: 
 
(A1)              
1
0 (1 ) [ (1 )] (1 ) 0 sbh b h
αα ααρ ρ
− +− + + − + =  
 
Unconstrained household: Equation (4) in the text yields an explicit solution for the 
unconstrained case, 
(A2)                            
1









u h , implies that the total financial assets  needed to finance such 
investment plus the household consumption is  * s ≡ 0 * sB + , where 
* B is the optimal 
borrowing level for the unconstrained household. This means that a household without 
access to the credit market with initial wealth at least equal to  * s  will achieve an 
identical solution to that of a household with full access to credit.   
The minimum household wealth required by financial institutions to lend them,s , must 
be less than * s because if 
* ss ≥ no household would borrow. Assume that banks require 
that the household finance 60% of the total wealth needed to finance the investment and 
the (optimal) consumption levels, out of its own funds; thus
* 0.6 s s =  (using the symbols 
in the text,  0.6 ξ = ). Given the parameters assumed, we have that s* = 17.57. That is, the 
minimum household wealth needed to be able to borrow in the formal market is 
s =10.54. 
The Table and Figure below show the investment levels for households for a range of 
initial wealth levels. For initial wealth levels below 10.54 the household is constrained 
and becomes unconstrained above that level.   The key point is that as  0 s increases from 1 
to 10 the (constrained) household investment increases gradually by small amounts 
(investment elasticities between 0.5 and 1). However, when the household wealth 
increases from 10 to 11 there is a discontinuity on the investment schedule, and thus the 
investment jump occurs: h increases by more than 70% for just a 10% increase in wealth.  
At this point the household borrows about 6 to complement its own funds of 11. Of 
course, rich households with initial wealth above 17.57 do not borrow but their 



















0 s   Investment levels 
(h) 
1  0.55 
2  0.84 
3  1.15 
4  1.45 
5  1.76 
6  2.06 
7  2.37 
8  2.68 
9  2.99 
10  3.30 
11  5.67 
12  5.67 
14  5.67 
Table A1. Investment levels 
by household initial wealth 
 (  10.54 s = )                      
Figure A1: Human Capital and Wealth: The “Investment Jump”          52
APPENDIX B: Data 
Table B1: Data and Sources for the Variables used in the Benchmark Regressions 





GDP growth (2000 US$)     Real GDP per Capita growth (Constant US$ 2000) 
 
1980 – 2004  World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Share of Govt. Exp. in 
Public Goods (Type A 
Goods) 
This is the share of government expenditure on 
public goods (Type A goods). Public goods are 
defined as expenditures in: 
 
I) Subsidies to Households: 
       i) Education 
       ii) Health 
       iii) Social security 
       iv) Religion and culture 
       v) Housing and community amenities 
2) Expenditures That Correct Common Market 
Failures: 
       i)Environmental Protection 
       ii) Research and development 
3) “Pure” Public Goods: 
       i) Transport 
       ii)  Communication 
       iii) Public order and safety 
 
1980 – 2004  Government Financial Statistics 
(IMF), Asian Development Bank, 
Country data 
Polity Index  
(Polity 2) 
Score ranges from -10 to 10, with the more 
democratic a nation, the higher the score. The 
Polity score is the difference between the 
institutionalized democracy and autocracy scores, 
with a higher score indicating a higher degree of 
democracy. The measures of institutionalized 
democracy and autocracy are composite indices 
derived from coded values of authority 
characteristics 
 
1980-2003 Polity  IV 
www.cidcm.umd.edu 
 
Years of Democratic 
Stability 
Square root of Durability of Polity if Polity 2>0  1980-2005  Polity IV 
www.cidcm.umd.edu 
 
Political Competition  Score that indicates how competitive is the Political 
System 
 
1980-2003 Polity  IV 
www.cidcm.umd.edu 
Share of Government 
Consumption over GDP 
  1980 – 2004  Penn World Tables (2006) 
 
  
Years of Schooling  Average Years of Schooling of Population over 15  1980-2000 (5 
year interval) 




Trade Openness  Sati index which is the residual of the regression of 
Trade on population, area, gdp per capita, dummy 
for industrialized country, dummy for oil exporter, 
and imports over export prices. A positive residual 
implies a more open economy 
 
1980-2001 Pritchett,  Lant. 1996. Updated by 
López and Galinato (2007) 
 
Note: Definitions of the remaining variables are available from the authors.   53
 
 




Observations Median Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
 
Growth of Per Capita GDP 
 
283 1.7  2.8 -13.4 8.2 
Share of Government 
Expenditure in Public Goods on 
total expenditures 
 
283 55.7 16.6 13.1 83.2 
Share of Total Government 
Expenditure over GDP 
 
283 19  8.2 7.3 54.1 
Share of Investment over GDP 
  283 17.5  8  2.6  50.2 
Inflation (%) 
  283 71.7  443 -0.08  6425 
Years of Schooling 
  283 5.9  2.8  1.2 11.9 
% Land In Tropics 
  283 0.2  0.4  0  1 
Polity 2 
  283 7.4  6.6 -9.6  10 
Political Competition 2 
  283 8.6  3.3  0  10 
Years of Democratic Stability 
  283 2.3  3.5  0  13.9 
Distance to the Equator 
  283 33 17.1  1  60 
Proportion of Population aged 
between 15 and 64 
 
283 62.5  6.1  48.1 73.2 
Initial Income Gini 
  283 37.7 10.8 19.1 61.3 
Population Density 






Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, 
Colombia, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Egypt Arab Rep., El 
Salvador, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran Islamic Rep., Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, 
Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovak Republic, South Africa, 
Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela RB, Zimbabwe 
 
Developed: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea Rep., Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States 
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Table C1: Bootstrap: Effect of Government Share in Public Goods on GDP per Capita Growth  
 
   
Three Stage Least Squares: Bootstrap Corrected Coefficients and 









Share of Govt. Exp. in Public Goods 







Small sample standard errors in brackets  




Country Dominance Checks 
 
Figure C1: Three Stage Least Squares Estimators: One Country Excluded From Each 
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Extreme Data Observations Checks 
 
Table C2: Changes in Extreme Data Points: Effect of Government Share in Public Goods on GDP 
per Capita Growth 
  Three Stage Least Squares Estimation 
 
  Bottom 5% Observations 
Dropped of Share of 
Government Expenditure in 
Public Goods 
Top 5% Observations 
Dropped of Share of 
Government Expenditure in 
Public Goods 
 
0.189** 0.120***   
Share of Govt. Exp. in Public Goods in 






   
  Bottom 5% Observations 
Dropped of GDP per Capita 
Growth 
 
Top 5% Observations 
Dropped of GDP per Capita 
Growth 
 
0.064** 0.092**   
Share of Govt. Exp. in Public Goods in 









Specification Checks: Adding New Control Variables 
 
Table C3: Additional Control Variables Considered in Robustness Checks 
 
1  Average No. of Revolutions (1980-1999) 
2  Presidential System Dummy 
3 Ethno-linguistic  Fractionalization 
4  Fraction of Protestants in 1970 
5 Proportional  Representation 
6  ICRG Law and Order rating 1980-1999 average 
7  Fraction of Muslims in 1970 
8  Fraction of Catholics in 1970 
9  Terms of Trade Growth 
10  Trade Openness (SATI index)  
11 Initial  Income  Gini 
12 Gini  of  Education 
13 Initial  Life  Expectancy 
14  Initial Primary School Completion Rate 
15  logarithm of (1+black market premium) – 1980-89 Average 
16 Distance  to  Equator 
17  Dummy Landlocked Country 
18  Log of level of Population between 15 and 64 
19 Population  Density 
20  Primary export share of total exports in 1970 
21 Corruption 
*All combinations of three controls are considered 
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Table C4: Robustness to Controls: Effect of Government Share in Public Goods on GDP per Capita 
Growth.  
 





Average of All Coefficients 
Averaged Weighted  of All 







Share of Govt. Exp. in Public 




% of Positive Coefficients 
 
100% 
Addition of three controls  per estimation from new control variables listed in table B3 
Small sample standard errors in brackets; 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table C5: Robustness to Controls:  Effect of GDP per Capita Growth on Government Share in 
Public Goods  
 
  





Average of All Coefficients 
Averaged Weighted  of All 











% of Positive Coefficients 
 
27.14% 
Addition of three controls  per estimation from new control variables listed in table B3 
Small sample standard errors in brackets; 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 